The aim of this article is to verify whether existing international legal mechanisms provide effective protection of privacy in cyberspace in supra-regional terms. For years, human rights systems have been perceived as effective mechanisms for strengthening the area of fundamental rights. Nevertheless, in the case of activities taking place in cyberspace, the protective standards arising from international treaties seem to be insufficient. Despite the dynamic expansion of legislation in the area of data protection, the scope of the standards being used is still localnational or regional, rather than global. Hence, it is necessary to consider whether attaining an equal level of privacy protection in cyberspace and in physical space does not require putting forward new legal mechanisms that not only overcome the limitations of existing international agreements, but also enhance the trust in and credibility of the global data market, given that it is essential to the development of modern society.
Introduction
The coming into force of Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) 1 and the considerable publicity it generated has made the public frequently focus its attention on data protection issues in recent years. As a result, the Regulation, which was part of a wider reform of the EU data protection model, has raised awareness of people's rights and obligations relating to the processing of personal data. Surprisingly, this was not due so much to the newly introduced legislation, but to an unprecedented number of publications regarding the possible consequences of the Regulation's applicability, which not infrequently contained exaggerations or alarmist language. It is also true that, while the GDPR was being discussed, other legislative works were draftedless noticeable but equally importantaddressing the problem of processing personal data on a supra-regional scale. These included, for instance, an amendment to Convention 108 of the Council of Europe (Data Protection Convention) 2 and the draft of a new international agreement on privacy and electronic surveillance measures applied by states, prepared under the auspices of Joseph Cannataci, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy. Although the public's interest in each of these documents was much less than in the GDPR, it seems that the need to develop a universal approach to the protection of privacy in cyberspace is an issue that will be grow in importance over the coming years, given the progressive globalization of digital services.
It is worth remembering that one of the reasons for commencing work on Directive 95/ 46 (the predecessor of the GDPR) 3 was the need to ensure coherence of personal data processing requirements and, therefore, to remove barriers to transfer of this data between EU countries, and to further tighten cooperation within the internal market. An observable consequence of adopting a common data protection model was also the need to develop a solution allowing free exchange of data with other, non-EEA countries. For the purposes of Directive 95/46, several legal procedures were introduced, providing for the execution of such transfers, the most important of which was based on so-called decisions on an adequate level of protection. As a rule, the decisions were to be issued by the European Commission, and the basis of their issuance was supposed to be an acknowledgement that the legal system of a third country, including its obligations under international law, made it possible to recognize that personal data obtained in its territory would be processed in an adequate (not worse) way in terms of security and the rights of data subjects. Despite its problems, this model has functioned for over 20 years and resulted in the EC issuing twelve decisions on an adequate level of protection.
However, when Directive 95/46 was prepared in the first half of the Nineties, it was obvious that the mechanism of cross-border data flow to third countries would not be able to form the basis of the construction of a supra-regional, universal data-processing model. There are at least three reasons for this assessment. Firstly, the EU legal model obviously regulated the transfer of data from the Union to third countries but not between particular third countries. Secondly, a large number of the EU's trading partners had discrete legal systems that were difficult to reconcile or clearly incompatible with those in force in the Union (e.g. the United States 4 ). Thirdly, the EU's economic position did not justify the assumption that the rest of the world would see EU regulations as an obvious standard to be applied globally. It should be remembered that, at that time, EU countries were pioneers in introducing national data protection laws. The problem of building supra-regional agreement in this field was not a key issue and, certainly, did not constitute a barrier to the development of economic cooperation.
Since then, at the end of the second decade of the twenty-first century, the above assessment has changed dramatically. Services provided in cyberspace are an important 2 Convention No. 108 of the Council of Europe for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data (adopted 29 January 1981, entered into force 1 October 1985). 3 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data [1995] OJ L281/31; repealed. 4 One of the main difficulties in introducing a data protection model similar to EU regulations in the U.S. federal legislation is the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, according to which no new law can be passed that would lead to a limitation of freedom of speech. As a result, freedom of speech has a special position in the U.S. constitutional system, de facto restricting other fundamental rightsincluding the right to privacy. The problem is widely discussed in the literature, see: E Volokh, 'Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You ' (2000) 52 Stan L Rev 1050; P Schwartz, 'The EU-US Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures' (2013) 126 Harv L Rev 1966. element of the economy of many countries, and they are also an accelerator of change in numerous areas of life. New forms of data processing, such as cloud computing and Big Data, have led to the actual globalization of the data-processing market. Attempts to apply national or regional regulations to activities carried out in cyberspace have proved highly problematic, and, as yet, no simple solution has been found to the difficulties.
Researchers dealing with the problem of protecting privacy in cyberspace from a global perspective have been indicating for many years that this problem can be solved effectively only by the use of more universal mechanisms of international law. This paper discusses the two concepts that have attracted the greatest attention and juxtaposes them with a third proposal, which allows the achievement of similar effects without the need to seek global (universal) consent to its application and, therefore, is free from the main drawback of the first two concepts.
Global data market and digital services provided globally
In the first place, it is necessary to introduce basic concepts and to explain the difficulties associated with existing legal frameworks around modern forms of information-processing techniques, and the specifics of the global data market. This concept is sometimes equated with services provided globally. Services provided globally are those that are available to a large part of the population. They can, however, be delivered from one or more locations. Classic examples of these types of services are social networks, streaming services and search engines. In turn, the term 'global data market' should be understood as a form of information processing that uses geographically distributed resources, usually located in several data centers in a way that optimize the efficiency of the service provided. Currently, the core technique of the global data market is cloud computing and resource virtualization. In the world of distributed processing, the same data can be processed at several dozen different data centers at the same time. Furthermore, each of these data centers can be served by another operator providing its services using its own geographically distributed cloud. Resource virtualization allows the sharing of a specific type of infrastructure between different digital service providers. As a result, tens, or even hundreds, of subcontractors may be involved in the process of providing a single service to a user, for example, online file storage. The same user request (such as downloading a file from online storage) can be carried out each time with the involvement of other resources located in other geographical locations.
However, the service does not have to be global to use global data-processing techniques. -These days, due to huge competition in the e-services industry, there is a common trend to outsource selected or all functions traditionally implemented by internal IT departments to external subcontractors, often offering their services using cloud computing. Even more often, network security devices (such as firewalls) are made available in the cloud computing model (so-called security-as-a-service 5 ). In today's world, it is almost impossible to provide a digital service without any element of trans-border data processing. For this reason, security breaches that result in negative consequences for users, needin the vast majority of casesto be assessed using the legal provisions of several countries, which is often impossible due to their inconsistencies.
Cloud computing is not the only emerging data-processing technique, which has obvious implications for the privacy of users. Another is Big Data analytics, whose purpose is to extract useful information from large data sets, often from publicly available sources (a process known as 'knowledge discovery'). Since Big Data's goal is to find previously undiscovered correlations between data sets, this method can lead to serious violations of users' privacy. There are a number of studies that have revealed the use of Big Data to invade individuals' privacy in the areas of health information, 6 sexual orientation 7 or the political views 8 of a large group of peoplesolely from publicly available data. 9 In many countries, especially those with less restrictive data protection regulations, the data broker sector is developing dynamically. Data brokers are companies that specialize in collecting vast amounts of data and building consumer profiles based on them, which can then be used for marketing and selling products. 10 What is particularly worrying is the lack of direct control of individuals over the data collected by this type of company. Due to the global nature of the Internet, data brokers may operate in any chosen jurisdiction, including ones in which there are no restrictions resulting from data protection law.
Both cloud computing and Big Data pose a typical horizontal threat to privacy. Another example of an emerging threat is related to electronic surveillance programs, undergoing dynamic development in many countries. Surveillance is usually connected with the actions of authorities, and therefore seen as a vertical threat. At the same time, however, changes to the global data market have meant that more surveillance activities are carried out by large technology companies than individual countries, and to a greater extent. In recent years, the issue of mass surveillance has been at the forefront of public concern. However, due to the global dimension of cyberspace, this problem should be analyzed not only from the point of protecting the individual from surveillance activities carried out by authorities in their own state, but from the governments of other states. 11 6 An example could be a study conducted by Australian researchers, in which, using publicly available information and an anonymous database of medical services provided, they were able to determine a list of medical services provided to seven selected Australian public figures, including former and current member of parliament In addition, while an individual may use proven legal tools in the case of infringements by statesfor example, tools defined in the human rights systemsthere is a problem in counteracting the use of surveillance by large and often cross-border digital service providers. Suffice it to say that it was not until 2019 that the ECJ resolved 12 the problem of whether VoIP services were subject to the regulations of the so-called Framework Directive 13and thus to other, detailed EU law provisions, including those relating to telecommunications secrecy. 14 For many years, a lack of clarity as to the scope of privacy safeguards associated with VoIP services (which are used by several million users in the EU every day) was the best indication of the risks involved in the development of new technologies. Similarly, recent reports indicating that the leading providers of voice assistant services record and forward private conversations of their users 15 for further analysis may prove that the risks related to cloud computing, Big Data analysis and electronic surveillance are often intertwined. This actually means that an effective solution to the risks associated with each particular technology must take account of the remaining technologies. What connects these technologies is the global data market and, therefore, discussion about new regulations intended to protect the users' privacy in cyberspace must acknowledge the distributed nature of data processing as a starting point.
In summary, an effective legal regime in the area of the right to privacy in cyberspace should:
− define the rights of individuals and the corresponding responsibilities of data controllers − provide a legal means for individuals to protect their rights, regardless of the place where infringements occur and the entity responsible for the violations − protect individuals against unauthorized violations in both horizontal relationships (free from government interference) and vertical (free from interference from non-state actors) as well as against violations originating from entities operating from third countries and from third country authorities − impose on service providers an obligation to ensure the lawfulness of data processing in the entire subcontracting chain − be based on a public law regime, so that individual rights are not diminished by the fact that processing is taking place in a state whose legal system has introduced incompatible obligations − be easily accessible to the individual, which should be understood as the possibility of using legal protection measures without the need to know a foreign legal system.
Privacy protection in global perspectivethe current status
When discussing the problem of the adequacy of adopted privacy protection mechanisms to risks occurring in cyberspace, it is first necessary to refer, even briefly, to the relationship between privacy and personal data. Omission or an excessive simplification of this issue will lead to distortions in the assessment of the suitability of currently applicable regulations. Both terms are often equated, or data protection is treated as a more detailed insight (almost lex specialis) within the more general area of legal protection of privacy. This is a mistake; the origins of the two terms are different and, although both privacy and data protection mechanisms enable effective protection of the same personal rights in many areas, these regulations de facto stem from discrete sources of law. Legal perspective on privacy is inextricably connected with the protection of human rights. The right to privacy was included in catalogues of fundamental rights as early as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 16 and, subsequently, in all relevant international legal acts implementing systems for the protection of human rights. From this perspective, the right to privacy expresses the freedom of an individual to decide what information on their personal life they provide and to whom. 17 This understanding of the right to privacy has also been reflected in the provisions of state constitutions. 18 The purpose of human rights systems is to protect an individual against unauthorized interference, both in horizontal and vertical relations. Since the right to privacy is recognized as a fundamental human right, it is universal, natural and inalienable. The purpose of legal regulations is to ensure that the right of an individual is respected and to provide tools for its effective enforcement.
Early provisions for data protection could actually have been treated as lex specialis in the case of the right to privacy, in relation to information processing in computer systems. 19 However, their scope quickly evolved towards public-law mechanisms, in which a dedicated supervision authority equipped with extensive and independent powers played a significant role. Suffice to say, under the GDPR a supervision authority may impose administrative fines for infringements of provisions that have no connection with anyone's violation of privacy. Data protection should, therefore, be seen as an area closely related to privacy but not identical to it, functioning at a different level of detail with regard to regulations introduced, and based on a different legal regime. A final, though equally important, difference worth mentioning concerns the goals of the regulations. In the case of privacy protection, the provisions mainly fulfill a protective function, whereas in data protection, this function is more regulatory. Within such a framework, while seeking adequate measures to ensure supra-regional (or even global) protection of privacy in cyberspace, it is possible to rely on both types of mechanisms: those arising from human rights systems (the 16 Compare the wording of Art. 12 of the UDHR. 17 That is why modern right to privacy also entails the right to control personal information, even after it has been disclosed to others. See: S Margulis, 'Privacy as a Social Issue and Behavioral Concept' (2003) 59(2) JSI 243. 18 This understanding of privacy is also known as 'informational self-determination'; this is the case in Polish constitutional provisions, in which the source of information autonomy is enshrined in Art. 51 of the Constitution (cf. the judgment of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal of 19 February 2002, U 3/01). In the case of Germany, informational self-determination has been defined by the constitutional court as: 'the authority of the individual to decide himself when and within what limits information about his private life should be communicated to others' (cf. the judgment of the German Federal Constitutional Court of 15 December 1983, BVerfGE 65, 1). More on informational self-determination and its meaning for privacy and data protection in A Rouvroy and Y Poullet, 'The Right to Informational Self-Determination and the Value of Self-Development: Reassessing the Importance of Privacy for Democracy' in S Gutwirth, Y Poullet, P de Hert, C de Terwangne and S Nouwt ( protective function) and international laws dedicated to data protection (the regulatory function). It is also possible to attempt to combine the two mechanisms into a single new legal regime.
Human rights systems
At present, the human rights system with the largest scope of application is undoubtedly the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The Covenant is an elaboration of the declarations established in the UDHR in the form of legally binding obligations undertaken by the states party to the agreement. 20 Currently, 173 countries are parties to the Covenant. 21 Although, historically, the ICCPR was not the first treaty providing for legal protection of privacy, 22 it is the only treaty of supra-regional scope of this type. The content of the right to privacy, stipulated in Art. 17 of the Covenant, 23 is semantically identical to that contained in human rights protection systems 24 and also in constitutional provisions of some EU countries. 25 In this respect, the Covenant defines privacy as a collection of protected values, which allows an expanding interpretation, adapting the scope of protection arising from this standard to ongoing economic and social changes. In this way, through interpretation of Art. 17, the Human Rights Committee (HRC)the control body established in the Covenantpoints out that the protection of personal data is an element of privacy protection and, as a result, violations thereof must be deemed to be violations of the Covenant. The general content of Art. 17, however, turns out to be insufficient to protect an individual's rights in vertical relationships, especially when an infringement arises from distributed, cross-border data processing. There are several reasons leading to such a conclusion.
First, the Covenant obligations are addressed to states. Although these obligations are both of a negative nature (refraining from unauthorized interference) and positive nature (introducing appropriate national standards providing for protection of an individual in vertical relationships), a violation of treaty obligations can, in principle, only be alleged against a state party to the Covenant. In the globalized world of data processing, an individual often does not even have the means to determine which entities in other countries have received their data. It is all the more difficult to imagine a situation in which an individual would be able to lodge a complaint against the government of the third country in which such entities operate if it turned out that the infringement resulted from legislative omissions by that state.
Secondly, through its inherent generality, the standard arising from Art. 17 of the Covenant also creates problems in demonstrating that certain national regulations insufficiently protect the rights of individuals. This problem is particularly visible in the case of specific duties relating to the protection of personal data. National law that allows further transfer Historically, the first treaty of this type was the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, hereafter referred to as the 'ECHR'. 23 See Art. 17(1) of the Covenant: 'No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation'. of data to a third country without due legal safeguards will not infringe Art. 17 because the mere fact of transferring the data does not result in the materialization of the risk of violating privacy. It should be remembered that a significant number of obligations resulting from the GDPR are, de facto, regulatory in their nature and the breaching thereof by an obliged entity is not tantamount to violating the privacy of specific individuals. In this regard, the protection provided for in the Covenant is not sufficient to counteract violations occurring in cyberspace.
Thirdly, the Covenant itself is equipped with a relatively ineffective control mechanism, based on quasi-judicial proceedings conducted by the Human Rights Committee. This procedure is more similar to arbitration, because it requires the consent of the parties to undergo the procedure, and the resolution of the dispute has no erga omnes effect in relation to other states' practice. It is worth noting that individuals' entitlement to lodge complaints has been in force for a relatively short time 26 ; previously, this was only available to states (the so-called inter-state complaints, art. 41 of the ICCPR).
As a result, although the ICCPR has the largest geographical scope of application of all currently existing human rights systems, it has not contributed to the creation of an effective legal mechanism for the protection of privacy in cyberspace.
Partly in response to the above problems, the proposal of establishing a world human rights court, formulated in the 1940s, has returned among the group of experts dealing with the area of fundamental rights. 27 Supporters of this concept would like the court to function on the basis of a new treaty; its broad mandate would allow effective assessment of violations of fundamental rights. This proposal is largely based on the legal framework of the International Criminal Court. Since this concept essentially seeks to further develop the protective function introduced by the ICCPR, it would not contribute to removing the weakness of the Covenant in the field of counteracting violations in cyberspace, even if it was implemented.
Convention 108+
Detailed elaboration of the protective functions provided for in the Covenant can be found in international legal acts dedicated to data processing. Yet, in reality, there is only one such treaty that introduces legally binding regulations and has a supra-regional scope: it is the Council of Europe's Convention 108. The convention, whose original version was opened for ratification on 28 January 1981, has been criticized for many years as an too general document, mainly aimed at promoting good practice in the field of data protection. The Convention was deprived of many legal mechanisms that, in the years following its adoption, became widespread in the national laws of its state parties. It also lacked the precision that would enable its incorporation into national legal systems in a manner that would not raise interpretational doubts. 28 Some of these comments have 26 This possibility was allowed for in the content of the Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. However, it should be noted that this protocol was subject to a separate ratification procedure; therefore, a smaller number of countries are parties to it (currently 116), excluding the United States, United Kingdom and Switzerland. Therefore, citizens of these countries have no possibility of submitting complaints directly to the control body established under the treaty (the HRC). The generality of the provisions of the Convention was one of the reasons for the commencement of the EC's own legislative work, resulting in the adoption of Directive 95/46. become obsolete as a result of a package of amendments adopted on 10 October 2018, to a large extent adjusting the Convention to legal mechanisms contained in Regulation 2016/679. However, the modernized agreement, known as Convention 108+, 29 has yet to be stripped of several significant flaws that may affect its potential to create a supraregional secure data processing framework.
Firstly, the modernized Convention still needs transposition into national law, which means that it is an act addressed to states, not being a source of direct obligations for the entities concerned (e.g. data controllers). An individual cannot, therefore, claim their rights solely on the basis of the provisions of Convention 108+. Data controllers are also not obliged to directly apply the above convention's provisions, but to implement the relevant regulations of national law. From the perspective of the data subject, this situation significantly impedes the exercise of their rights in the case of infringements resulting from cross-border data processing. Moreover, the Convention does not provide for the possibility of using legal protection measures appropriate in the individual's place of residence. 30 Secondly, this act does not provide for the establishment of a dedicated judicial body competent to resolve disputes arising from its application.
This means that the treaty does not establish a body whose jurisprudence can contribute to the standardization and unification of the way in which legal provisions are interpreted in all states that are party to the treaty. To some extent, ECtHR may be treated as such a controlling body, because in cases relating to an alleged violation of Article 8 of the European Convention, regulations provided in the Data Protection Convention are also taken into account. 31 From the perspective of the residents of states that are party to the ECHR, such a solution is beneficial, since it incorporates regulations resulting from Convention 108, in addition to the more general protection regime defined in Article 8 of the ECHR. However, it should be noted that not all parties to Convention 108 are also parties to the ECHR. Where this is the case, individuals are unable to refer complaints to any supranational controlling body. In the case of cross-border disputes, such persons must rely on relevant national law (which may be ineffective with respect to a foreign controller) or choose a way of claiming their rights in a foreign jurisdiction (which is appropriate to the controller). In both cases, the benefits of functioning in the Convention 108+ system may be severely limited.
Thirdly, although Convention 108 is a supra-regional treaty, the majority of its parties are European countries. Theoretically,, non-members of the Council of Europe may also accede to the Convention, but, in practice, only a few countries have decided to take 29 Convention 108+ is, in fact, Convention 108 amended by the Protocol no. 223 of 10 October 2018 <https://www.coe.int/ en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/223> accessed 30 October 2019. Consolidated text of the Convention 108 as it will be amended by the Protocol No. 223 upon its entry into force available at <rm.coe.int/16808ade9d> accessed 30 October 2019. 30 The Convention stipulates the obligation of the supervisory authority designated for the place of residence of the data subject to mediate in the submission of a complaint to the competent authority. See. Art. 18 (2) of the Convention 108+ (n 29). 31 The Data Protection Convention is often referred to in the case-law of the ECtHR concerning the interpretation of specific terms regarding the protection of privacy and personal data. such a step during the 30 years of its existence. 32 Notably, this group contains no leading centers of new technology development, such as the United States, China or India. Due to the short period of time that Convention 108+ has been open for ratification, it is not certain whether this trend will continue or not, and whether the more up-to-date provisions will prompt a larger group of countries to decide to incorporate it in their national legislation.
A separate issue meriting discussion is the problem of EU accession to Convention 108 as an international organization. Mooted since the beginning of the Nineties, this possibility has now, along with the reform of Convention 108, been explicitly included in the text of the Convention. However, the difficulties relating to the EU's accession of the ECHR remain. Despite the strong binding of EU treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights to the European Convention, 33 the ECJ twice negatively criticized the negotiated accession agreement. 34 In a judgement issued in 2015, the Court pointed out that binding the EU directly to the European Convention could limit the competence of the ECJ as guardian of the treaties. 35 In the Court's opinion, there existed the possibility that interpretation of EU law would depend on the decision of a judicial body that is not an institution of EU. The possibility of the ECJ being bound by ECtHR case law could, in the view of the Luxembourg Court, be a threat to overall interpretation of EU law. 36 The ECJ's reservations regarding the EU's accession agreement to the ECHR can, in fact, be applied to all treaties to which the EU would be a party, and which would provide for the possibility of setting up its own controlling body empowered to issue legally binding judgments.
EU data protection laws
Currently, Regulation 2016/679 is undoubtedly the world's the most extensive legal regime for data protection. Due to the nature of EU law, this is also an example of how data protection can be effectively regulated at a supranational level. The Regulation, as a result of its direct applicability, introduces the same obligations interpreted in the same way in all 28 EU Member Stateswithout the risk of incorrect transposition into national law. Moreover, as an element of EU law, it is subject to interpretation by the ECJ. The functioning of this supranational judicial body, whose case law has an erga omnes effect, is an additional benefit that ensures the consistency of the protection model provided by the Regulation.
32
This group includes Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia and Uruguay (see: <cli.re/g3X7Vz> accessed 30 September 2019). These are not countries holding a significant position in the global market of IT outsourcing services. 33 In the case of the right to privacy (defined both in the ECHR and the CFR) due to Art. 52(3) of the CFR, its scope and interpretation in EU law is identical to that used in the European Convention. Thereforetaking into account Art. 6 of the TEU -ECtHR case law relating to the violations of Art. 8 of the ECHR constitute general principles of the Union's law. 34 The Court dealt with this case for the first time in 1996that is, before the Charter of Fundamental Rights was adopted in 2001 and before it was given the same legal value as the treaties that resulted from the Lisbon reform in 2009. See: Case C-2/94 (ECJ 28 March 1996) EU:C:1996:140. A second, also negative, opinion was issued in 2014. See: Case C-2/13 (ECJ 18 December 2014) EU:C:2014:2454. 35 Such a situation could occur if the interpretation of the European Convention provisions by the ECtHR were binding on the EU and its institutions, including the Luxembourg Court. The ECJ also noted that such a dependency would not take place in the other directioni.e. the interpretation by the ECJ of a right recognised by the ECHR would not be binding on the control mechanisms provided for by the ECHRsee C-2/13 (n 34) [185] . Although the reform of EU data protection legislation also encompassed issues of crossborder data flow to third countries, it did not introduce significant innovations in this matter. 37 Some scholars perceive such a change in the new definition of the territorial scope of the Regulation, according to which EU provisions will have to be applied also by administrators based in third countries, if they offer their services to residents of the Union. 38 However, it should be noted that the territorial scope of EU data protection law has already been the subject of interpretation by the ECJ. In the Weltimmo judgment, the Court supported a flexible view of the concept of establishing a company. 39 Accordingly, in order to determine whether a given data controller is conducting an economic activity within the meaning of EU data protection law in a Member State other than the state of formal registration, the Court pointed to the need to assess the stability of the organizational solution, as well as the actual nature of the business in a Member State. The considerations presented were particularly applicable to companies that provide services solely on the Internet, often from a distant country. Another reason for recognizing that data processing takes place in the context of business activities conducted in the EU is the provision of a website in a language commonly used in that Member State. 40 The Weltimmo case was settled in 2015, four years before the application of Regulation 2016/679. Despite the passage of sufficient time to adapt, many foreign digital service providers operating in the EU market have still not taken sufficient measures to adapt to European data protection laws. 41 This is why it seems to be an unjustified hope that application of the GDPR will resolve problems with abuses relating to the processing of data in third countries. In fact it is difficult to reasonably assume that exercise of the GDPR regime could be effectively enforced by data subjects or EU supervisory authorities with respect to data controllers operating in different legal systems, subject to different local provisions (often incompatible with EU law) and judiciary. 42 Such attempts at extraterritorial use of national regulations (in this casean international organization's law) always meet third country objections. The economic position of the EU is also not strong enough to assume that other countries (e.g. the United States, China, and India) will have to adapt to these regulations for fear of losing an important trading partner. 43 Weltimmo (n 39) [32] . 41 In addition to companies that offer services on the EU market while not fully applying the provisions of the GDPR, one should also mention/highlight entities that, in response to new regulations, announced withdrawal from the European market (for example Yeelight). See: He Li, Lu Yu and Wu He, 'The Impact of GDPR on Global Technology Development' (2019) 22 J Glob Inf Technol Manag 2-3 <DOI:10.1080/1097198X.2019.1569186> accessed 30 October 2019. 42 The problem of the extraterritorial appliance of EU law is not only specific to the data protection regulations. Similar provisions can be found in relation to the infringements of personality rights caused by publishing a defamatory article on the Internet. In this regard, the ECJ in the Bolagsupplysningen case ruled that an individual 'must have the option of bringing an action for damages, in respect of all the harm caused, before the courts of the Member State in which the centre of his interests is based'. See: Case C-194/16 Bolagsupplysningen (ECJ 17 October 2017) EU:C:2017:766 [32] . For detailed analysis of problems relating to the extraterritorial scope of the GDPR see: A Azzi, 'The Challenges Faced by the Extraterritorial Scope of the General Data Protection Regulation' (2018) 9 JIPITEC 126. 43 It should be noted that the regulatory model introduced in the GDPR has found many followers among legislatures from other parts of the world. In China, for example, it has been proposed to adopt national provisions introducing data Therefore, even though the GDPR has led to a considerable strengthening of the data protection model within the internal market, it has not seen a significant change in EU policy covering cross-border data flow to third countries. Suffice to say, since the Regulation took effect in 2018, no changes have been made to Decision 2016/1250 of the Commission on an adequate level of data protection issued with respect to the United States (constituting the basis for the so-called Privacy Shield program), which is currently being criticized as potentially incompatible with EU law. 44 Another limitation is the material scope of the regulation, in particular, the fact that it does not cover the area of national security and, as a result, violations relating to surveillance activities of the state. This is why, even though EU citizens can, on the basis of the provisions of the Regulation, complain about infringements by the data controller, even if they are based in another Member State, they still cannot protect their rights in relation to surveillance activities carried out by their own government. As a result, the basic legal tool for EU residents in limiting extended electronic surveillance activities is not EU law, but the European Convention and complaints made to the ECtHR. This national security exception affects the whole of EU law, not only the regulation. Therefore, depriving the GDPR of this limitation would de facto require building a new legal instrument, similar in terms of applied measures to Regulation 2016/679, but operating outside the context of EU law.
Despite the above reservations, some researchers differ in their perceptions of the GDPR and its impact on the global data processing market. For example, Michael L. Rustad and Thomas H. Koenig argue that 'the GDPR has the potential to not only bring an end to the transatlantic data privacy wars, but to become the basis of a worldwide "gold standard" for global data privacy'. 45 This seems to be an overly optimistic assessment that may have resulted from the identification of the GDPR with the entire EU data protection model. However, this is not the case and the Regulation should not be considered in isolation from other EU laws because it leads to oversimplifications that result in errors. In the EU legal system, the basic source of the right to privacy and the protection of personal data is not the Regulation, but the Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFR). Currently, after the Lisbon reform, the right to data protection has also been explicitly defined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. In fact, in the existing case-law of the ECJ, restrictions on the free transborder flow of personal data have been justified mainly by the provisions of the CFR, not by possible violations protection mechanisms similar to those of the EU model. In this case, however, it should be remembered that the regulations are mainly intended to limit abuses related to data processing by commercial entities. They are also very general and vague in nature. As stated by Nicholas F. Palmieri. 'without adequately clear guidelines, data processors are left without any clear way of knowing whether or not their behaviour complies with the law'. What is moredue to its undemocratic political systemit is also difficult to compare the entire privacy protection model implemented in China to the one operating in the EU, for the simple reason that in the Chinese legal system both privacy and protection of personal data are not considered fundamental rights. See more: S Sacks, 'New China Data Privacy Standard Looks More Far-Reaching than GDPR' CSIS (29 January 2018) <cli.re/L9PrrV> accessed 30 September 2019; NF Palmieri, 'Data Protection in an Increasingly Globalized World' (2019) 94 IndLJ 297. 44 The first ECJ cases in which the legality of the Privacy Shield program was challenged were initiated soon after the issuance of decision 2016/1250 (one of these cases -T-738/16has not been decided yet). The Privacy Shield program and legal uncertainties regarding it are discussed in more detail in: A Philouze, 'The EU-US Privacy Shield: Has Trust Been Restored' (2017) 3 EDPL 463; A Butler, 'Whither Privacy Shield in the Trump Era' (2017) 3 EDPL 111; PM Schwartz and K Peifer, 'Transatlantic Data Privacy Law' (2017) 106 GeoLJ 170. 45 ML Rustad and TH Koenig, 'Towards Global Data Privacy Standard' (2019) 71 Florida L Rev 366. of secondary laws. 46 It is the treaties and the CFR in the EU law system that set the basic standard for assessing compliance with EU law. Referring to the thesis formulated by Rustad and Koenig, even if the United States adopted a legal regime similar to the GDPR (which is objectively impossible), this would not ensure adequate protection of the U.S. legal system comparable to the model functioning in the EU. The basic differences between the US and the EU do not concern differences in data protection regulations, but a different scope of fundamental rights. EU Member States defined the right to privacy and the right to the protection of personal data as key elements of its legal system. That is why, in relationships with third countries, such as the United States, the condition for recognition of adequacy will not lie in solutions 'compatible with GDPR', but in the recognition of the right to privacy in the broadest sense of this term in the catalogue of fundamental rights.
New initiatives
A separate source of binding legal requirement for individual's protection against arbitrary interference into privacy was supposed to be the draft international agreement proposed by the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, regulating the issue of electronic surveillance carried out by states. 47 This proposition was the result of several years work relating to assessment of the scale of national surveillance programs and their impact on the area of fundamental rights. 48 It was also result of discourse on the protection of privacy in the digital age conducted within the UN. 49 The legal mechanism was intended to limit unauthorized surveillance and, thus, to protect an individual in vertical relations. In this respect, it would therefore constitute an extension of the guarantees provided for in Art. 17 of the ICCPR, which expand the rights of an individual and the duties of authorities, in a spirit consistent with the case-law of international courts dealing with matters of mass surveillance.
The draft agreement was distinguished from previous treaties by a different approach to the issue of regulating cross-border data processing. In the existing agreements, including those already established in the twenty-first century, international standards mainly served to approximate national laws. However, the burden of implementing and supervising the application of regulations still rested on institutions operating in individual countries. An example is the Council of Europe Convention on 46 In all landmark cases related to cross-border data flow, the ECJ pointed to violations of rights and obligations arising from the CFR and the TEU. See, for example, the judgment invalidating the retention directive (C-293/12); the judgment invalidating the EC decision 2000/520 establishing the Safe Harbor program (C-362/14); judgment related to UK's and Swedish surveillance laws (C-203/15); opinion on the compliance with EU law of the proposed EU-Canada agreement related to transfer of PNR data (C-1/15).
47
'Working Draft Legal Instrument on Government-Led Surveillance and Privacy', UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy (28 February 2018) <cli.re/GJD2JB> accessed 30 September 2019. 48 The draft agreement was developed under the MAPPING (Managing Alternatives for Privacy, Property and Internet Governance) Project, which was co-financed by the 7th Framework Programme of the European Commission. See: <mappingtheinternet.eu> accessed 30 September 2019. 49 The immediate reason for the UN forum's interest in privacy protection in cyberspace was disturbing information on the scale of US electronic surveillance programs that was revealed in 2013. As a result, the High Commissioner for Human Rights was requested to prepare a report on the right to privacy in the digital age. This report and the discussion it provoked became the reason for the appointment by Human Right Council of a Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy. Cybercrime 50 : even though it has gained almost global acceptance, its implementation has not contributed to the elimination of barriers to the exchange of data on pending criminal proceedings. According to the Special Rapporteur on Privacy, the causes of this problem can be found in an outdated perception of measures appropriate to the regulation of cyberspace: one of the main reasons for this relative failure is that it has continued to rely too much on the 19th century mind-set of the sovereign nation state rather than cater for the reality of the borderless internet of the 21st century. 51 Therefore, the draft of the new treaty contained a proposal to not only harmonize the substantive provisions applicable in individual countries, but to also introduce crossborder instruments to implement theman example is the international data access warrant (IDAW). It was intended to be a legal order to retain certain categories of electronic data, issued by treaty bodies and addressed to all entities operating in the territory of the treaty states that might have such data. The implementation of this concept required the establishment of a specialized control body authorized to issue such orders. This role was to be fulfilled by the International Data Access Authority (IDAA). 52 The proposed agreement did not therefore attempt to reduce the scale of electronic surveillance globally but to create a supranational mechanism that would be effective even if only some countries joined it. This goal was to be achieved by strengthening the rights of individuals, and at the same time facilitating the cross-border surveillance of persons suspected of committing serious crime. An important innovation was the attempt to move away from the model of founding such cooperation on bilateral agreements between individual countries, in favor of a transnational agreement built on transparent principles. Countries that chose not accede to the agreement could not benefit from the facilities it provided (e.g. application for IDAW), but they would not be obliged to apply restrictions relating to the scope of surveillance. And this was the second significant feature of the proposed treatyit not only imposed obligations on states, it also offered significant benefits related to facilitating criminal proceedings.
Unfortunately, the draft agreement was rejected by both the United States and China (that is, states conducting extensive bulk surveillance programs), and by the Member States of the European Union. 53 As justification, it was argued that the new agreement duplicated solutions set forth in other international agreements. However, this explanation cannot be accepted, especially taking into account the fact that China has still not ratified the ICCPR, whereas the United States notified of a number of derogations, depriving In fact, IDAA was to consist of four bodies (see Art. 16 of the draft agreement)one advisory and consultative (Surveillance Legal Instrument Consultative Committee), two judicial/control bodiesissuing decisions in two instances (International Data Access Commission and International Data Access Tribunal) and the last one responsible for monitoring the process of issuing and applying IDAW (International Committee of Human Rights Defenders). individuals of the right to invoke the provisions of the Covenant in cases pending before the national courts. 54 Nevertheless, the above situation best illustrates governments' resistance to the implementation of new mechanisms that protect the rights of individuals in cyberspace.
Towards a new legal regimepossible scenarios
The limited effectiveness of existing regulations pertaining to the protection of privacy in cyberspace is an issue that has been present in discourse for many years. Arguments regarding the need to develop a dedicated legal solution to minimize risks occurring in virtual space had already been raised in the Nineties. But it was the dynamic development of the Internet and related digital services and, above all, the globalization of the data processing market that has turned this discussion into a very current matter.
First of all, it is worth referring to two general and, at the same time, opposing concepts of the regulation of events taking place in cyberspace. The first one assumes that the primary source of regulation should be domestic and regional laws, whereas supra-regional norms of international law should be used only as supplementation, especially for the determination of the relevant jurisdiction (choice of law clauses). The idea of basing regulation that governs events taking place in cyberspace on local legislation is not new. It is underpinned by the notion that cyberspace is just a new form of communication, so, in principle, legal assessment of events that take place there does not necessitate the enactment of distinct legal measures. 55 However, any attempt to implement such a solution naturally encounters barriers related to the collision of different legal systems, where it is often impossible to unify substantive regulations because of incompatible political solutions. 56 Nowadays, regulations belonging to this model are the most common ones; they are based on laws whose scope is only regional, whereas international regulations are applied in a supplementary way. 57 In turn, the second concept presumes the leading role of international legal regulations. Some extreme advocates of this approach have proposed the establishment of cyberspace as an autonomous area of jurisdiction. 58 This proposal refers to the concept of international spaces. Modelled on Outer Space, High Seas and Antarctica, cyberspace would be excepted from the sovereignty of individual states and, as a result, from the application of their national laws. As in the case of unification of substantive provisions, the implementation of this proposal makes it necessary to adopt mechanisms of international law. However, this would not lead to approximation of legislation but to submitting the resolution of matters relating to cyberspace to a separate jurisdiction. It should be remembered that treaties regulating other international areas have been based on some form of consensus resulting from established custom. In the case of cyberspace, there is no such custom; nowadays it is difficult to find prohibitions limiting the scope of acceptable use of cyberspace that are actually respected on a global scale. In addition, cyberspace has already gained a significant economic dimension. The commercialization of space, the seabed, or Antarctica, despite current progress, is negligible compared to the scale of commercial activity in cyberspace. The economies of many countries rely heavily on digital services. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the problem of regulating cyberspace is not only about difficulties in relating it to physical space. Cyberspace is also a sociological phenomenon, in which people and the relationships between them are a key issue. 59 Therefore, the establishment of cyberspace as a separate international space seems to be not only an unlikely solution but also a rather impractical one.
The second model also includes a number of other proposals strictly focusing on the issue of privacy protection. Their common feature is that of imparting a greater significance to international legal standards, without postulating the creation of an autonomous jurisdiction at the same time. In these proposals, international law is meant to serve the purpose of standardizing and defining common protective and regulatory provisions, which can then be amended or supplemented by national law.
Bearing in mind that, at present, there are de facto two sources of requirements at an international level that can form the basis for seeking an effective mechanism for supranational privacy protection in cyberspace, i.e. the ICCPR and Convention 108, it is obvious 56 Inconsistency of legal systems could, in turn, lead to the actual unenforceability of judgments issued by foreign courts. An example may be judgments relating to freedom of speech, which are not enforced by the U.S. courts (based on the ordre public clause), because of the potential effect of restricting rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the that the proposals put forward are based on these treaties, postulating the combining of both protective functions (the human rights system) and regulatory functions (detailed provisions on the protection of personal data) into one legal mechanism.
The first proposal seeks to link the ICCPR with an appropriately adapted Convention 108+. This option is promoted especially by the Council of Europe, 60 but, notably, also by researchers whose views on data protection are other than Eurocentric. An example would be Graham Greenleaf, who postulates that a new, universal model of data protection should be based on the interconnection of the ICCPR and Convention 108 in line with the following assumptions:
− the HRC's recognition of Convention 108 by updating General Comment No. 16 61 and indicating the connection between Art. 17 of the ICCPR and Convention 108, − the Council of Europe's imposition of a requirement of new countries acceding to Convention 108, which are not parties to the ECHR, concerning the necessity of adopting the first optional protocol to the ICCPR, − the HRC's review of individual complaints against violations of the provisions of Convention 108 by states party to the ICCPR; in consequence, the HRC would serve a similar function to the European Court of Human Rights in the European Convention system. 62
However, putting G. Greenleaf's proposals into practice does not solve the problem of the lack of a quick and effective court path in which judgments issued would be effectively erga omnes and would contribute to the implementation of uniform standards in all countries with the same data protection regulations. Furthermore, there would be a real problem with the use of 'double standards' in relation to the provisions of Convention 108+: violations linked to the member states of the Council of Europe would probably be submitted for review to the ECHR, whereas other cases would be handled by the HRC. This, in turn, could lead to a duality of jurisprudence and, in effect, to the application of different data protection standards.
On the other hand, a noticeable benefit of the implementation of G. Greenleaf's concept is the lack of a need to negotiate or accept new international legal acts. Both the Covenant and Convention 108 are already existing instruments. Even the necessary adaptation work seems to be less complicated to carry out in the international arena than putting forward the adoption of a completely new treaty (cf. earlier comments on the legal mechanism proposed by Joseph Cannataci). An alternative proposal to the one above has been formulated by the International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners (ICDPPC). This forum developed and in 2009 adopted the International Standards on the Protection of Personal Data and Privacy (ISPPDP). 63 In addition, it was proposed that the ISPPDP should become universally binding through their adoption in the form of a new, third additional protocol to the ICCPR. In this way, interested states would be able to accede to this protocol and, in consequence, jointly create a supra-regional standard for the protection of personal data. Although theoretically possible to implement, this concept has a significant drawback in the form of a e lack of real support from governments. The ICDPPC is a body associating data protection authorities: organizations that, in most, cases enjoy a large degree of freedom of action and independence from national governments. Hence, even the significant support of data protection ombudsmen to adopt a specific legal international solution does not in any way mean that the proposal will be supported in intergovernmental relations. Although a resolution postulating the introduction of a legally binding instrument based on the ISPPDP was adopted in 2013, 64 no further real measures have been taken to implement it. 65 Both concepts presented above have one feature in common: it is the perception of the universality (globality) of the adopted data protection model as a prerequisite for ensuring its effectiveness. Of course, this assumption is not devoid of a rational basis. Experience suggests that the application of national legislation to cyberspace is ineffective. Similar constraints are found in the standards laid down by international organizations with a regional scope (e.g. the GDPR). Hence, it could seem that, without ensuring universality, any legal model will turn out to be ineffective. However, this is not the case. First of all, the ICCPR is still not a universal treaty, despite the passage of over 50 years since it came into force. China, for instance, has never ratified the Covenant, and the United States notified of derogations that deprive it of its actual usefulness at the level of national law. Secondly, in my view, there is room for the development of a new international agreement that could be the source of effective mechanisms of privacy protection in cyberspace, even if only partially accepted by individual states. This concept can be outlined in the following points:
(1) the formal basis should be an international agreement of a legally binding nature;
(2) the subject matter of this treaty should be the establishment of an international organization competent to define requirements and supervise their observance in the field of data processing in cyberspace; (3) the way to achieve this goal should be granting the organization the competencies needed to enact its own standards of conduct and legal norms in relation to cyberspace, of a regulatory and not strictly protective nature; (4) the law enacted by the organization should be directly effective in the legal systems of the states party to the convention; (5) within the framework of the treaty, an authority competent to develop guidelines and recommendations should be establishedsimilar to WP29 (an element of soft-law and market self-regulation), (6) the treaty should appoint or indicate a judicial authority; however, submission to the dispute settlement procedure should not depend on the parties' discretion, and judgments passed should have an erga omnes effect.
The above proposal is not so much about aligning the existing protective solutions by supplementing them with a regulatory function as postulating the creation of an international organization competent to implement binding data protection standards in cyberspace. Obviously, inspiration from the European Union model can be easily found in this concept. However, what distinguishes the proposal put forward from EU legislation is its sole focus on the execution of a dedicated function, without a political or economic connection with the countries of a specific region of the world. Therefore, this model can be described as 'EU+' for convenience.
The consequence of adopting the above proposal would be the creation of a secure data processing space, functioning in the countries that acceded to the new treaty. This space would be a distinct fragment of the Internet, legally separated (and physically in part) from the rest of cyberspace, due to which it would be possible to implement effective measures not only of cross-border data flow but also of enforcing one's rights in the case of violations. The Internet should not be perceived today as space free of regulation. In fact, there are more and more partially separated segments of the Internet in which individual states are imposing their own principles of content processing. Nowadays, it is usually the practice of non-democratic states, which introduce content filtering and restrict freedom of speech in this way. The same techniques can be used to build a secure, cross-border data processing area for strengtheningnot weakening democratic values. At the same time, the implementation of the proposed legal regime should not in any way lead to restriction of freedom of speech (as is the case in non-democratic states), but instead serve to create a secure, supranational data processing space and limit (restrict) access to it from third countries (e.g. through technical measures related to blocking the transmission of large data sets).
It is also not true that the Internet as a whole is not subject to regulation. Such a misunderstanding is no doubt related to equating the Internet with cyberspace. The Internet is a global IT network, a very large (but finite) collection of network devices, telecommunications links and protocols. In turn, cyberspace is an area that does not have a physical dimension and, in practice, it exists due to internet connectivity. While, in fact, no regulator is able to imperatively determine the way in which the Internet functions, many of the elements that are key to its operation are managed by specific entities. This is, for instance, the case of the IP networks addressing scheme and DNS root zone registers, which have been handled for many years by ICANNa U.S. law entity, until recently supervised by the U.S. Department of Commerce. 66 The main DNS servers are also important for the smooth 66 The problem of the great impact of U.S. entities on decisions made regarding core elements of the Internet network architecture have been subject to numerous analyses. See: D Hunter, 'ICANN and the Concept of Democratic Deficit' operation of the Internet; there were originally thirteen of them and all were located in the United States. Currently, mainly due to virtualization, they are more evenly distributed geographically (though a few of them are still managed directly by U.S. government bodies, including one managed by the Department of Defense and one by the U.S. Army). 67 The appointment of a dedicated authority competent to regulate cyberspace could not only facilitate the creation of a secure data processing space, but also strengthen protection mechanisms against many other cyber threats. It could also be used to fight copyright infringements and effectively counteract the distribution of spam, malware, etc. Certainly, taking into account geopolitical constraints, it appears that the above proposal stands little chance of rapid implementation. These constraints are manifested by, amongst others, the failure of negotiations on the adoption of a new agreement regulating electronic surveillance, as well as disputes regarding the functioning and reactivation of the GGE group within the UN. However, in contrast to previously discussed proposals, its implementation would offer a real opportunity to increase the level of security and effective protection of data processed in countries that would likely participate in such an agreement. In this case, the utopian assumption that supranational data protection laws need to have universal (global) scope to be effective can be rejected.
In search of a new concept of privacy
The current meaning of the term 'the right to privacy' and its universal understanding is another research problem that emerges during discussion on effective supra-regional protection of privacy. It should be remembered that the understanding of the term 'privacy' in legal sciences and psychology is different. 68 Although psychologists formulate diverse definitions of this concept, in principle they agree that privacy expresses the need of a human, and thus determines the proper development of an individual in society. 69 If an individual deprived of privacy develops incorrectly, then also massive violations of privacy (e.g. due to the use of bulk surveillance by the state) must have a negative impact on the development of society. 70 On the other hand, the need to lay down precise law makes it necessary to try to describe the very concept of privacy and the forms of its violation as concisely as possible. Therefore, in human rights systems, an approach based on the indication of a catalogue of protected values has been adopted. In turn, in the USA, privacy is more often defined by indicating ways of violating it. 71 Each of these approaches assumes, however, that an individual wants to protect information concerning them, and the legal regime is expected to provide tools to safeguard this right.
One of the fundamental barriers to establishing supra-regional regulations in the area of privacy protection relates to the lack of universal acceptance of the view that privacy is a human need and, therefore, deserves legal protection. Thus, is there not a common, globally acceptable code of privacy, acceptable not only at a political level (reflecting the views of those currently in power), but also at a social, or sociological level? It seems that this is a fundamental question that needs to be answered, taking into account the organization of modern societies, which are currently taking shape and largely drawing on building relationships in cyberspace. If a significant part of the entire population has created accounts on a single social networking site and hundreds of millions of users regularly publish private content from their lives there, perhaps the way of understanding the right to privacyas worded in human rights systemshas become obsolete? In the Seventies, Irwin Altman demonstrated that privacy is a universally present phenomenon, existing in all the different cultures and communities that he studied. 72 Perhaps, however, globalization has led to a different evolution of societies in this respect, changing the meaning of privacy and societies' related needs? Most of the published legal analyses dealing with the direction of the evolution of cyberspace law omit this aspect, assuming the legal definition of privacy, which originated in the 1940s, as dogma. 73 Therefore, it seems that discussion on the validity and adequacy of the models of supraregional privacy protection in cyberspace considered in this article should be preceded by verifying whether the scope of protection planned in the regulations actually reflects the needs of modern democratic societies. Only then will it be possible to discuss in detail the available solutions and promote the one that corresponds to social values and needs as closely as possible.
Summary
Along with the increase in the scale of abuse relating to the privacy of Internet users, more and more often public attention will be drawn to the lack of effective legal measures to counter such cases. A number of possible solutions to this problem have been formulated: the implementation of some of them seems completely unrealistic from today's 71 A different approach to conceptualizing privacy has been proposed by D. Solovethe so-called bottom-up approach. Daniel Solove suggests that privacy should be analyzed in the context of a situation, rather than in the abstract; this way it is possible to 'begin with the problem itself rather than trying to fit the problem into a general category'. More: D Solove, 'Conceptualizing Privacy ' (2002) Sources of inspiration for such analyses can be found in studies conducted by sociologists. For example, Debbie Kasper analyzed information published in the U.S. press over a fourteen year period (1990) (1991) (1992) (1993) (1994) (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) . The survey concerned texts that referred to the term 'invasion of privacy'. In this way, over 3,700 news stories were selected. The aim of the research was to determine whether, during the period under consideration, an evolution of the understanding of the term 'privacy violation' and the scope of this change were evident. The author determined that the most frequently occurring form of the violation was still acquisition of information (called extraction)on average 60% of the investigated cases; in second place was intrusion (on average 21%); the least frequent cases were connected with observation (18%). In addition, the researcher presented a number of specific conclusions relating to particular types of violations. This study deserves attention due to the choice of an unusual research method (an analysis of press articles), which allows tracking trends in a large population (the United States). Details: DVS Kasper, 'The Evolution (Or Devolution) of Privacy' (2005) 20 Sociological Forum 69. standpoint; others obviously require cooperation between the countries concerned. However, the difficulty in implementing individual proposals should not be the only factor taken into account during their assessment. Otherwise, the international mechanism adopted may not come up to expectation and fail to improve the level of privacy protection in cyberspace.
It seems that the reason why a universally acceptable model of privacy protection in cyberspace has still not been developedalthough this problem was noticed almost 30 years agois the lack of a common understanding as to the nature of legal protection of privacy. The differences between countries refer not only to the definition of privacy and the interrelationship between privacy and personal data, but also to whether privacy should be included in the catalogue of fundamental human rights. Without harmonizing the concepts and definitions used, it will be difficult to reach a consensus at the level of legal norms that would have a truly universal scope; today both privacy and its violation are defined differently in the European Union, the United States and China. 74 Even in the EU, where the most extensive protection model has been established, a new directive was introduced in 2019 to allow the settling of financial liabilities to digital content providers by delivering personal data to them as payment. 75 The concept of 'selling privacy'however common on the Internetseems difficult to reconcile with establishing a rigorous protection regime for privacy and including this right in the group of fundamental rights.
After clarifying the definition of the right to privacy, it will be possible to analyse which of the concepts presented should ensure its effective protection in cyberspace and, in particular, whether the establishment of a global, universal standard should be perceived as a condition for this effectiveness. Only later will it be possible to answer the question whether it is necessary to combine protective and regulatory functions to achieve this standard and whether this goal can be reached with the use of existing international treaties.
Undoubtedly, the success of the EU data protection model proves that it is possible to effectively regulate the processing of personal data on a supranational scale. At the same time, critics of the GDPR highlight the fact that EU legislation has only solved difficulties existing within the internal market, whereas the free flow of data between the Union and its foreign partners is still far from optimal in many areas. Hence, it is necessary to give further impetus to supranational regulation that will enshrine respect for the privacy of individuals as one of the global standards of data processing. This, of course, can draw upon the EU's more than twenty years of experience in creating a secure data processing space.
The postulates presented in this paper, especially those relating to the establishment of a new international organization, can certainly be critically assessed by the academic community. The 'EU+' proposal would be difficult to implement not only due to geopolitical 74 For review of data protection regulations in place in EU, US and China markets see: NF Palmieri (n 43). 75 See. Art. 3(1) of Directive 2019/770. Although the EU legislature pointed out that 'the protection of personal data is a fundamental right and that therefore personal data cannot be considered as a commodity' (recital 24), it considered that it was necessary to adopt regulations providing consumers with the right to remedies in such cases. The purpose of the directive is to extend consumer protection where a customer does not pay a financial price but instead provides the trader with personal data. But this does not change the fact that allowing the possibility of settling obligations by providing personal data leads to doubts as to whether this not collide with the perception of personal data as a fundamental human right. constraints but also due to the demonstrable need to educate the public, which would prevent mistaken perceptions of such changes. 76 In the author's opinion, the proposal to establish a separate international organization dedicated to exercising the competences assigned to it by states related to regulating cyberspace is a postulate that will allow the use of knowledge and experience relating to the functioning of the EU model, human rights systems as well as conclusions drawn from the work of the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to privacy. At the same time, the EU + model would also create a framework for redefining key terms and concepts ensuring the consistency of internationally applied principles. Moreover, it could also help in resolving the limitations of the EU privacy model, which, it is increasingly being argued, has led to an excessive increase in standards of protection, though only within Member States. In this respect, participation by EU countries in the concept of establishing a new, supra-regional international organization could not only contribute to the export of good practices in the field of EU data protection law, but would also constitute a kind of 'quantum leap'it would allow development of a new, more comprehensive protection model before restrictions relating to the current model begin to limit cooperation with third countries or reduce the competitiveness of EU companies.
It appears that there is no real alternative to tightening cooperation in the field of cyberspace protection, including the area of fundamental human rights. An increasing part of the activity of developed societies involves the use of cyberspace, and all available analyses indicate that this trend will not change in the foreseeable future. Individual governments will be increasingly confronted with the problem of how to ensure the adequacy of legal mechanisms available to citizens and, at the same time, to not introduce unnecessary barriers to economic development, including digital services provided in cyberspace. Regardless of the assessment of the particular solutions proposed, the question of developing a supra-regional standard of privacy protection in cyberspace will remain valid and will be one of the key issues of new technology law in the coming years.
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